add -insecure flag and relevant tests

jpetazzo · jpetazzo · commit 280901e5fbd0 · 2013-08-13T16:20:22.000-07:00
diff --git a/container.go b/container.go
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ type Config struct {
 	VolumesFrom     string
 	Entrypoint      []string
 	NetworkDisabled bool
+	Privileged      bool
 }
 
 type HostConfig struct {
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ func ParseRun(args []string, capabilities *Capabilities) (*Config, *HostConfig,
 	flMemory := cmd.Int64("m", 0, "Memory limit (in bytes)")
 	flContainerIDFile := cmd.String("cidfile", "", "Write the container ID to the file")
 	flNetwork := cmd.Bool("n", true, "Enable networking for this container")
+	flPrivileged := cmd.Bool("privileged", false, "Give extended privileges to this container")
 
 	if capabilities != nil && *flMemory > 0 && !capabilities.MemoryLimit {
 		//fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "WARNING: Your kernel does not support memory limit capabilities. Limitation discarded.\n")
@@ -194,6 +196,7 @@ func ParseRun(args []string, capabilities *Capabilities) (*Config, *HostConfig,
 		Volumes:         flVolumes,
 		VolumesFrom:     *flVolumesFrom,
 		Entrypoint:      entrypoint,
+		Privileged:      *flPrivileged,
 	}
 	hostConfig := &HostConfig{
 		Binds:           binds,
diff --git a/container_test.go b/container_test.go
@@ -1313,3 +1313,35 @@ func TestOnlyLoopbackExistsWhenUsingDisableNetworkOption(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 }
+
+func TestPrivilegedCanMknod(t *testing.T) {
+	runtime := mkRuntime(t)
+	defer nuke(runtime)
+	if output, _ := runContainer(runtime, []string{"-privileged", "_", "sh", "-c", "mknod /tmp/sda b 8 0 && echo ok"}, t); output != "ok\n" {
+		t.Fatal("Could not mknod into privileged container")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPrivilegedCanMount(t *testing.T) {
+	runtime := mkRuntime(t)
+	defer nuke(runtime)
+	if output, _ := runContainer(runtime, []string{"-privileged", "_", "sh", "-c", "mount -t tmpfs none /tmp && echo ok"}, t); output != "ok\n" {
+		t.Fatal("Could not mount into privileged container")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPrivilegedCannotMknod(t *testing.T) {
+	runtime := mkRuntime(t)
+	defer nuke(runtime)
+	if output, _ := runContainer(runtime, []string{"_", "sh", "-c", "mknod /tmp/sda b 8 0 || echo ok"}, t); output != "ok\n" {
+		t.Fatal("Could mknod into secure container")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPrivilegedCannotMount(t *testing.T) {
+	runtime := mkRuntime(t)
+	defer nuke(runtime)
+	if output, _ := runContainer(runtime, []string{"_", "sh", "-c", "mount -t tmpfs none /tmp || echo ok"}, t); output != "ok\n" {
+		t.Fatal("Could mount into secure container")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/docs/sources/commandline/command/run.rst b/docs/sources/commandline/command/run.rst
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
       -e=[]: Set environment variables
       -h="": Container host name
       -i=false: Keep stdin open even if not attached
+      -privileged=false: Give extended privileges to this container
       -m=0: Memory limit (in bytes)
       -n=true: Enable networking for this container
       -p=[]: Map a network port to the container
@@ -38,3 +39,15 @@ Examples
     docker run -cidfile /tmp/docker_test.cid ubuntu echo "test"
 
 | This will create a container and print "test" to the console. The cidfile flag makes docker attempt to create a new file and write the container ID to it. If the file exists already, docker will return an error. Docker will close this file when docker run exits.
+
+.. code-block:: bash
+
+   docker run mount -t tmpfs none /var/spool/squid
+
+| This will *not* work, because by default, most potentially dangerous kernel capabilities are dropped; including  ``cap_sys_admin`` (which is required to mount filesystems). However, the ``-privileged`` flag will allow it to run:
+
+.. code-block:: bash
+
+   docker run -privileged mount -t tmpfs none /var/spool/squid
+
+| The ``-privileged`` flag gives *all* capabilities to the container, and it also lifts all the limitations enforced by the ``device`` cgroup controller. In other words, the container can then do almost everything that the host can do. This flag exists to allow special use-cases, like running Docker within Docker.
diff --git a/lxc_template.go b/lxc_template.go
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ lxc.console = none
 # no controlling tty at all
 lxc.tty = 1
 
+{{if .Config.Privileged}}
+lxc.cgroup.devices.allow = a 
+{{else}}
 # no implicit access to devices
 lxc.cgroup.devices.deny = a
 
@@ -69,7 +72,7 @@ lxc.cgroup.devices.allow = c 10:200 rwm
 
 # rtc
 #lxc.cgroup.devices.allow = c 254:0 rwm
-
+{{end}}
 
 # standard mount point
 #  WARNING: procfs is a known attack vector and should probably be disabled
@@ -95,11 +98,15 @@ lxc.mount.entry = {{$realPath}} {{$ROOTFS}}/{{$virtualPath}} none bind,{{ if ind
 {{end}}
 {{end}}
 
+{{if .Config.Privileged}}
+# retain all capabilities; no lxc.cap.drop line
+{{else}}
 # drop linux capabilities (apply mainly to the user root in the container)
 #  (Note: 'lxc.cap.keep' is coming soon and should replace this under the
 #         security principle 'deny all unless explicitly permitted', see
 #         http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=31054627 )
 lxc.cap.drop = audit_control audit_write mac_admin mac_override mknod setfcap setpcap sys_admin sys_boot sys_module sys_nice sys_pacct sys_rawio sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config
+{{end}}
 
 # limits
 {{if .Config.Memory}}
